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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) provides
that a trademark will lose its registered status "if the regis-
tered mark becomes the common descriptive name of an arti-
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cle or substance. ... 1 Where trademark distinctiveness is a
litigated issue,2 most courts find that the term has become
"generic" 3 if it is in general use by the buying public as a de-
scriptive designation of the product rather than as an indica-
tion of origin.4 Because a generic listing of a trademark in a
1. The Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1946), as amended by Act of
Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 9, 76 Stat. 771.
"Trademark" is defined by the Act as "includ[ing] any word, name, symbol, or
device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant
to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by
others." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 ("Trademark"). For the functions of trademark protection
see generally 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3B, at 86
(1973).
2. The issue may arise in litigation in several ways. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c)
"any person who believes that he is or will be damaged by the registration of a mark"
may file a petition to -cancel the mark's registration if that mark has become the
"common descriptive name" of the product. Such petitioners will normally be busi-
ness competitors but the FTC may petition for cancellation, also. Where the trade-
mark owner brings an infringement suit, the infringer may raise as a defense the
owner's abandonment of the mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(2) (1976). Abandonment may
result where the owner's conduct "causes the mark to lose its significance as an indi-
cation of origin"; i.e., the mark has become "generic." See, e.g., Leblanc Corp. v. H. &
A. Selmer, Inc., 310 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 776 (1963) (de-
fense that registered mark is merely descriptive used to defeat infringement suit).
Once the trademark becomes "generic" and its registration is cancelled, the term
may be freely used by any competitor. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12:1, at 406.
See also 3 R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES, at 224-
25 (3d ed. 1969 & Supp. 1978).
Examples of once valid trademarks which have been cancelled for becoming the
generic name of the product are aspirin, Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505
(S.D.N.Y. 1921), cellophane, DuPont Cellophane Co., Inc. v. Waxed Products Co.,
Inc., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936), thermos, King-Seely Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus-
tries, Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963), and yo-yo, Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal
Tops Manufacturing Co., Inc., 343 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1965).
3. The Lanham Act uses "common descriptive name" but "generic" has the same
meaning. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12:18A, at 441. A trademark must identify
goods and distinguish them from others. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 ("Trademark"). Once the
term no longer identifies and distinguishes the goods so as to signify their origin but
merely describes the type of product itself then the term can no longer serve as a
trademark. It has lost its distinctiveness because the term fails to designate the
source of the product and indicates only the general type. See 1 J. GILSON, TRADE-
MARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 2.02 (1980 & Supp. 1980). Because of the frequent
use of the term "generic" in this article, the quotation marks will no longer appear as
the word will be used throughout with no specialized meaning.
4. The leading test of genericness was stated by Judge Learned Hand in Bayer
Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921): "The single question, as I
view it, in all these cases, is merely one of fact: What do buyers understand by the
word for whose use the parties are contending?" The fact-finder must determine
whether the buying public understands the term as designating a single source of
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dictionary is significant evidence of this general public use,5
corporations have a large interest in preventing such a listing.6
However, the Lanham Act gives no statutory authority to pro-
ceed against noncompetitive, non-product generic use by
another.
This article addresses one type of generic misuse involving
the improper listing of registered tradeffiarks in dictionaries.
The article concludes that there is no legal remedy for a
trademark holder against a dictionary publisher who improp-
erly lists the holder's mark and suggests curative legislation.
Part I considers the merits of providing effective legal ac-
tion to trademark owners against dictionary publishers in
light of the available non-legal remedies. After concluding in
Part I that there is a need for such a cause of action, Part II
examines the existing sources of legal action against a diction-
ary publisher. Finally, Part III suggests legislation to enable a
trademark holder to deal with dictionary misuse of his mark.
I. THE NEED FOR A LEGAL REMEDY AGAINST A DICTIONARY
PUBLISHER
A dictionary listing of a trademark in a generic senses is
product or as merely describing the product. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 3, § 2.02[1], at 2-
11 to -12.
5. See note 9 infra and accompanying text.
6. After expensive advertising and promotion campaigns centered around a par-
ticular term, a mark becomes of great value to a corporaton as a means of identifying
its product and as a symbol of good will. S. OPPENHEIM & 0. WESTON, UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION: CASES AND COMMENTS at 32-33 (3d ed. 1974).
Consequently, a corporation will protect its trademark because of its substantial busi-
ness value.
7. Lunsford, Trademarks and Semantics: The Use and Misuse of Trademarks in
Dictionaries and Trade Journals, 62 TRADEMARK REP. 520, 542 (1972). See notes 24-
25 infra and accompanying text.
Other types of noncompetitive, non-product use are potentially harmful to the
distinctiveness of a mark in addition to generic dictionary listings; e.g., use of the
trademark in a generic sense in newspapers, books, magazines and trade journals is
similarly outside of the statutory reach of the Lanham Act. 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note
2 at 242 n.86, suggests the possibility of continuous generic misuse by a radio come-
dian against whom the corporate trademark owner would be without remedy even
though such use may cause the public to understand the term in a generic way.
8. E.g., "Coke 2 [pronunciation], n. Am. Colloq. a dark-colored, carbonated soft
drink [short for Coca-Cola, a trademark]." See Trademarks in Dictionaries, 59
TRADEMARK REP. 735, 753 app. (1969) (panel discussion). The proper listing of the
Coca-Cola trademark, according to the United States Trademark Association, reads
"Coke 2 [pronunciation], n. Trademark, a dark-colored, carbonated soft drink [short
1981]
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damaging evidence that the term has become the common de-
scriptive name of the product." Even before litigation, the list-
ing may induce writers, publishers and members of the buying
public to use the trademark generically.10 Consequently, the
improper dictionary listing may hasten the erosion and ulti-
mate cancellation of the owner's proprietary rights in the
mark.1 Although the Lanham Act requires the trademark
owner to take action to maintain his mark's exclusiveness, 2 it
grants the owner no authority to proceed against such generic
misuse.' s
To date, trademark owners have relied upon non-legal
remedies to prevent or counteract the misuse of their mark by
a dictionary publisher.' 4 The simplest course is objecting to
the generic listing by writing letters of protest to the offending
publisher.'3 Yet, even if the publisher agrees to revise or strike
for Coca-Cola, a trademark]." Id. at 753 app. A generic listing is not corrected by an
added indication that the term is also a registered trademark. Remarks of Mr. Hof-
stetter, id. at 748.
9. 1 J. GnmsON, supra note 3, at 2-14 to -16. Though courts and trademark tribu-
nals differ as to the weight accorded a dictionary entry almost all consider such evi-
dence relevant as helping to determine the meaning of the disputed term. See, e.g.,
American Thermos Products Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 9 (D. Conn.
1962), af'd, 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963), where the court said: "[T]he fact that the
word was being included in most dictionaries and the fact that the generic definition
was occurring more and more often, evidenced the widespread growth of 'thermos' as
a synonym for 'vacuum-insulated' in common usage particularly in connection with
bottle, jug, jar and flask." 207 F. Supp. at 17.
Courts also make use of expert testimony, public testimony and consumer survey
evidence in determining genericness. 1 J. GiLsoN, supra note 3, at 2-14 to -20.
10. Remarks of Mr. Kunin, 59 TRADEMARK REP., supra note 8, at 737.
11. Remarks of Mr. Hofstetter, id. at 748.
12. "When any course of conduct of the registrant, including acts of omission as
well as commission, causes the mark to lose its significance as an indication of origin."
15 U.S.C. § 1127(b) ("abandoned") (emphasis added) (1976).
Reasonable conduct under this provision may call for the trademark owner to dis-
cover generic uses by publications and protest such use. See American Thermos
Products Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 207 F. Supp. at 17, where the court found
the plaintiff corporation negligent for not seeking out and protesting generic uses of
"thermos" by non-trade publications.
1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12:19, at 423, suggests that a trademark owner
should never be considered negligent for not suing a generic using publication "for
the law appears to offer no sure basis on which to do so."
13. Lunsford, supra note 7, at 542.
14. See Remarks of Mr. Hofstetter, 59 TRADEMARK REP., supra note 8, at 748. Mr.
Hofstetter's statement that no trademark owner has initiated legal action against a
dictionary publisher for generic misuse remains true today.
15. 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, at 241. Many companies are reluctant to write
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out the listing, the lengthy time between editions and the long
useful life of a dictionary lessen the effectiveness of this self-
help remedy.
The trademark owner might consider educational advertis-
ing as a method of strengthening his mark against the harmful
effects of the generic listing.16 However, the effectiveness of
such a campaign is doubtful and it may even work against the
owner if the descriptiveness issue is litigated.
Foremost among the non-legal remedies is the service of
the Committee on Dictionary Listings formed by the United
States Trademark Association. s The Committee acts as a
general liaison between the dictionary publishers and the
trademark owners in negotiations and maintains a file of pre-
ferred listings submitted by the owners which allows speedy
inquiry by the publishers.1 9 The Committee has been success-
ful in preventing the improper dictionary listing of many,
though not all, registered trademarks.20 A working relation-
ship with the publishers is crucial to the Committee's success
and many major publishers remain in close contact but
"where the dictionary publisher is unwilling to cooperate,
nothing of a substantial nature can be done to force such co-
operation."2 In any event, when the incorrect generic listing
appears in a particular dictionary edition, the Committee is
too late.
The trademark holder's interest in preventing a generic
listing outweighs, the interests of the dictionary publisher and
anything stronger than a polite letter asking for cooperation because of their fear of
creating ill will. Death of a Trademark, AM. PREss, Feb. 1952, at 20, quoted in Deren-
berg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes, 44 CALxr.
L. REv. 439, 464 (1956).
16. Such advertising seeks to educate the public as to the correct use of the trade-
mark. 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12:19, at 422. E.g., "Our lawyers can present
their entire case in 25 words or less. Xerox is a registered trademark. It identifies our
products. It shouldn't be used for anything anybody else makes. Our lawyers figure 25
words or less to the wise should be sufficient." TME, Sept. 19, 1969 at 37.
17. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 3, § 2.0217], at 2-28 to -29.
18. Lunsford, supra note 7, at 542-43.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 543. See also Remarks of Mr. Patty, 59 TRADEMARK REP., supra note 8,
at 745.
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the public in listing it.22 If the mark is repeatedly misused by
a dictionary publisher the trademark owner must helplessly
stand by and watch his mark deteriorate. Therefore, to pre-
serve the distinctiveness of his valuable trademark under the
Lanham Act, a trademark owner must have some effective le-
gal remedy to stop generic misuse of his trademark by a dic-
tionary publisher.28
II. EXISTING LEGAL ACTION AGAINST DICTIONARY MISUSE OF
TRADEMARKS
As this article argues that there is need for a legal remedy
against generic listings of a trademark by a dictionary pub-
lisher, this section surveys the existing sources of such a cause
of action.
A. The Lanham Act
Although it provides for the cancellation of a mark when it
becomes generic, the Lanham Act gives no statutory remedy
to trademark holders to prevent noncompetitive, noncommer-
cial generic misuse.24 The Act affords the registrant a remedy
22. The publisher's interest in including a trademark definition is based on his
desire to produce a competitive product. Remarks of Mr. Mitchell, 59 TRADEMARK
REP., supra note 8, at 738-42. The creation of a legal remedy against generic listing
will eliminate this competitive interest because any offending publisher would be
sued by the trademark owner, thus negating whatever competitive advantage sought.
See note 43 infra regarding the burden of an injunction on a dictionary publisher.
The public interest in freedom of speech and ideas will not be impaired by requir-
ing a dictionary publisher to accurately list the term as a registered trademark. Main-
taining the distinctiveness of a corporation's trademark benefits the public because
the consumer is better able to identify a particular product. See 1 J. McCARTHY,
supra note 1, § 2:12, at 76-77.,
The interest of the trademark holder, see note 6 supra, is preserving the trade-
mark and its tremendous business value.
23. See Lunsford, supra note 7, at 542. ("If courts recognize that a trademark
owner is damaged because of the use of the same or confusingly similar mark, how
can they fail to be cognizant that potentially greater harm can result from repeated
misuse of a mark?") (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
24. 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12:19, at 422. No action is available for non-
competitive confusion because the Act limits the test to infringers. 15 U.S.C. §
1114(1) (as amended). This section requires that confusing use of the mark be "use in
commerce" which is defined as use of the mark on goods when sold or transported or
on services when used for display or advertising purposes. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Because
the Act requires the likelihood of confusion, dilution will not be actionable as a type
of infringement. See 1 J. GILSON, supra note 3, § 5.05[9], at 5-45 to -46.
See Note, 77 HARv. L. REv. 520, at 524-26 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Note], for
[Vol. 65:179
TRADEMARK MISUSE
against competitors who use a confusingly similar mark25 but
fails to protect him against continued generic misuse of his
identical mark.
B. State Antidilution Statutes
Seventeen states have enacted antidilution statutes which
provide for injunctive relief against "likelihood of injury to
business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of
a mark . . . notwithstanding the absence of competition be-
tween the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source
of the goods or services."2 The purpose of these statutes is to
extend protection of a trademark beyond the Lanham Act by
allowing an injunction against nonconfusing use of the mark
by noncompetitors which affects the trademark's
distinctiveness.7
an excellent discussion of the scope of trademark protection provided by the Lanham
Act.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1946) (as amended).
26. Model State Trademark Bill § 12 (as amended through December 1964), re-
printed in 2 J. GmsoN, supra note 3, § 10.03, at 10-199 app. reads in full:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive
quality of a mark registered under this Act, or a mark valid at common law, or
a trade name valid at common law shall be ground for injunctive relief not-
withstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of
confusion as to the source of the goods or services.
Id.
The statutes are substantially alike as most states have followed the antidilution
provision of the Model State Trademark Bill. See generally Pattishall, The Dilution
Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, Its Progress and Prospects, 67
TRADEMARK REP. 607 (1977).
This section of the article deals only with the dilution provision of the state an-
tidilution statdites. The "injury to business reputation" provision of the antidilution
statutes has not been given much attention by the courts. See 1 J. GUSON, supra note
3, § 5.05[2], at 5-30 n.10. Corporate plaintiffs still rely on the common law remedy of
commercial dispargement in dealing with persons causing harm to their business rep-
utation. See Part il.C.1 infra; 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, at 962-63.
The seventeen state antidilution statutes are: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-550 (1978);
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-
lli(c) (West 1981); DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 3313 (Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 106-115
(1968); IDAHO CODE § 48-512 (1977); LL. REv. STAT. ch. 140, § 22 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1980); IoWA CODE ANN. § 548.11 (West Supp. 1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110B,
§ 12 (West Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 417.061 (Vernon 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §
87-122 (1976); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:12 (Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-
3-10 (1978); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1968); OR. REv. STAT. § 647.107
(1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-2-12 (Supp. 1980).
27. See 1 J. GiLsoN, supra note 3, § 5.05[9], at 5-41; 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 1,
§ 24:13A, at 155. If the defendant's use of the trademark does not involve a likelihood
19811
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An antidilution statute, on its face, seems to provide a ba-
sis for action against a noncommercial generic user such as a
dictionary publisher2 s and many commentators favor this ex-
tended application of the statute.29 Callman states that the
dilution doctrine fundamentally involves the loss of a trade-
mark's distinctiveness by another's repeated use30 and this ap-
proach includes incorrect generic dictionary listings. However,
courts are presently reluctant to apply the antidilution stat-
utes to noncompetitive, commercial uses. Thus, it is not likely
that they will further extend the statutes to noncompetitive,
noncommercial uses such as improper dictionary listings.
The leading example of the general judicial nonacceptance
of antidilution statutes is Girl Scouts of the United States v.
Personality Posters Mfg. Co.,31 where the court denied injunc-
tive relief because of the absence of confusion despite the
clear language of the New York antidilution statute that con-
fusion is not required. 2 Most courts agree with Girl Scouts
of confusion per 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1), then no action for trademark infringement will
lie under the Lanham Act.
28. See text at notes 41-43, infra.
29. See, e.g., 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, at 954-57; 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1,
§ 24:13E, at 161 ("[Tlhe dilution doctrine could, and should, be available for this
[generic misuse] purpose"); Lunsford, supra note 7, at 544; Remarks of Mr. Hofstet-
ter, 59 TRADEMARK REP., supra note 8, at 748.
Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes,
44 CLIF. L. REv. 439 (1956), commenting on the enactment of antidilution statutes in
four states, observes:
[I]t would seem clear that this language is broad enough not only to include
the traditional case of dilution heretofore discussed, in which the uniqueness of
a trademark may be impaired as a result of trademark use by others of the
same mark on totally unrelated goods, but might also be resorted to to give
some measure of relief in the far more serious and frequent cases of dilution
through public use leading to a gradual loss of distinctiveness of a well known
trademark.
Id. at 463 (emphasis added).
30. 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, at 954. Callman, in an oft-quoted passage, states:
The gravamen of a dilution complaint is that the continuing use of a mark
similar to the plaintiff's will inexorably have an adverse effect upon the value
of the plaintiff's mark, and that, if he is powerless to prevent such use, the
plaintiff's mark will eventually be deprived of all distinctiveness.
Id.
31. 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
32. 304 F. Supp. at 1233. In denying the injunction, the court stated: "Despite
the seeming intention of this statute to confer protection where the federal Lanham
Act might not, viz., even where there is no confusion as to the origin of the goods, the
courts have denied relief where confusion is absent." Id. (citations omitted).
[Vol. 65:179
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and require satisfaction of the traditional likelihood of confu-
sion test under the Lanham Act.3 3 Even where there is confu-
sion or the parties are in actual competition, some courts hold
that the statute is inapplicable since an action for trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act could then be brought.3
For various reasons,35 the concept of dilution "largely has
33. 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, at 957-58 and at 177-78 (Cum. Supp. 1978). See,
e.g., Cue Publishing Co., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 45 Misc. 2d 161, 256 N.Y.S. 2d
239, aff'd, 259 N.Y.S. 2d 377 (1965) where the court refused to grant an injunction
because to "give effect to the dilution doctrine some measure of confusion must be
present. . . ." Id. at -, 256 N.Y.S. 2d at 245.
Calhman argues that: "Unless recovery for dilution is allowed without reference to
competition or confusion, the legislative mandate of the antidilution statutes will be
frustrated . . . ." 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, at 178 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
But see Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d
538, 369 N.E.2d 1162, 399 N.Y.S. 2d 628 (1977), where the New York Court of Ap-
peals stated:
Notwithstanding the absence of judicial enthusiasm for the antidilution
statutes, we believe that sec. 368-d [the New York antidilution statute] does
extend the protection afforded trade-marks and trade names beyond that pro-
vided by actions for infringement and unfair competition. The evil which the
Legislature sought to remedy was not public confusion caused by similar prod-
ucts or services sold by competitors, but a cancer-like growth of dissimilar
products or services which feeds upon the business reputation of an established
distinctive trademark or name. Id. at 544, 369 N.E.2d at 1165, 399 N.Y.S.2d at
632.
34. 1 J. GiLSON, supra note 3, § 5.05[9], at 5-42. See also Pattishall, supra note 26
at 613-14. Courts also restrict the protection of the antidilution statutes by requiring
that the trademark be a "strong mark." 2 J. McCARerHY, supra note 1, § 24:14, at 162-
64.
35. Courts and commentators have cited many reasons for the judicial reluctance
to apply the state antidilution doctrine in the absence of confusion or competition.
The difficulty of applying the state statute in conjunction with the federal Act is one
explanation of why judges fail to apply the state act strictly. Note, supra note 24, at
528-29. This difficulty may join with the courts' desire to avoid the thorny problem of
federal preemption. Id. Whether a state has power to provide additional statutory
protection normally involves difficult constitutional questions where the federal act is
within the. constitutional authority of Congress. Developments in the Law-
Competitive Torts, 77 HRv. L. REV. 888, 943 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
ments]. But this constitutional question should not arise because there is no reason
to believe that Congress intended the Lanham Act to preempt the area of trademark
protection thus nullifying the state antidilution statutes. 1 J. GiLSON, supra note 3, §
5.05[9], at 5-45 to -46. Although there is nothing in the Lanham Act itself indicating
preemption, when the Lanham Bill was reported, the Senate Committee on Patents
said that "the purpose of this bill is to place all matters relating to trademarks in one
statute and to eliminate judicial obscurity. .. ." S. Res. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1943). Most courts have tacitly accepted the position that the Lanham Act does not
preempt additional trademark protection afforded by the state. Note, supra note 24,
at 189.
Another reason cited for the judicial nonacceptance of the antidilution statutes is
1981]
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been ignored by the courts despite the plain dictates of the
statutes.""6
Some courts, however, have applied the antidilution stat-
ute without requiring likelihood of confusion or competition 7
and this appears to be the trend,8 even though most have
used the statute only as an alternative ground for relief.39 In
Bristol-Meyers Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co.,40 the court expan-
sively construed the New York antidilution statute41 in grant-
ing an injunction against a generic user of the plaintiff's
their vagueness. The term "dilution" is nowhere defined, Pattishall, supra note 26, at
617, and the statutes are silent as to the likelihood of confusion. 1 J. GILSON, supra
note 3, § 5.05[9], at 5-42. The inherent fuzziness of the dilution concept makes judges
hesitant to deal with it. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:13B, at 156.
Callman points to the "judicial unwillingness to recognize a trademark as property
and an understandable antipathy to modern advertising," 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note
2, at 960, as factors affecting the courts' reluctance to apply the dilution statutes. He
also suggests that the traditional connection of trademark protection to unfair com-
petition may account for part of the hostile reaction to dilution. Id. at 959.
Uncertainty as to the desirability of additional trademark protection may be a
factor. Note, supra note 24, at 528. The public interest is less affected where confu-
sion is absent and the interests of the noncompetitive user may be substantial. Id. at
529.
Finally, Pattishall suggests that the courts are fearful of the potential abuse of
antidilution statutes. Pattishall, supra note 26, at 615-16. Their concern is that large
corporations will gain an unfair advantage over small businesses by strictly enforcing
the distinctiveness of their trademarks and that free speech will be impaired. Id.
Whatever the reasons for the judicial reaction against state antidilution statutes
(other than constitutional objections), they should not be relevant in light of the leg-
islature's clear policy determination that such statutes are desirable.
36. Pattishall, supra note 26, at 610.
37. E.g., Polaroid Corporation v. Polaroid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963). This
case is the leading judicial acceptance of a state antidilution statute because the court
applied the provision unfettered by Lanham Act requirements stating that: "If the
Anti-dilution Statute is not applicable to this situation, it is useless because it adds
nothing to the established law on unfair competition . . . ." Id. at 837.
See also cases cited in Pattishall, supra note 26, at 611 n.30.
38. 2 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24:13D, at 159. "[I]n more recent cases, some
courts are beginning to appreciate and enforce the dilution approach." Id.
39. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 3, § 5.05[9], at 5-44. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polar-
oid, Inc., supra note 37.
40. 151 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
41. The opinion in Bristol-Meyers Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co., id., nowhere indicates
reliance upon the New York antidilution statute but this article assumes, as have
many commentators, that the court applied the antidilution statute without explicit
reference thereto. See, e.g., 1 J. GmsoN, supra note 3, § 2.03, at 2-29 n.89; Remarks of
Mr. Hofstetter, 59 TRADEMARK REP., supra note 8, at 748. S. OPPENHEIM & G. WEs-
TON, supra note 6, at 125 n.69. Contra 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, at 243 n.87, where
the author states: "This was a typical case of comparative advertising." Id.
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trademark. Although competing products were involved, the
court came close to adopting the Callman interpretation of di-
lution in holding that, "Defendant is also guilty of diluting the
distinctive quality of plaintiff's trademark 'Bufferin' by tend-
ing to render it generic and descriptive." 4 But to date no
court has applied an antidilution statute to noncompetitive,
nonproduct generic use.43
Although the state antidilution statutes "do seem to pro-
vide a basis for proceeding against the inaccurate definition of
trademarks in dictionaries, '44 the restrictive reading given
them by most courts prevents a trademark holder from having
a cause of action against a generic misuser. If he is to have a
legal remedy, the aggrieved trademark holder must look else-
where, for state antidilution statutes will not help him.
C. Common Law Tort Actions
Several commentators have suggested that a common law
tort action be considered against an offending dictionary pub-
lisher where the mark is protected under the Lanham Act.45
The tort actions most applicable to the generic listing of a
trademark by a dictionary publisher are defamation, commer-
cial disparagement, interference with contractual relations, in-
terference with prospective advantage and interference with
property.4"
42. 151 F. Supp. at 514.
43. See 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 12:9, at 422.
Courts would probably be reluctant to apply an antidilution statute to a diction-
ary publisher because of the burden on him. The point in time at which injunctive
relief is sought would be an important consideration. Correcting a listing at the pub-
lishing stage is far different from recalling purchased editions or sending out correc-
tive statements. For a discussion of the corrective remedy, see Lunsford, supra note
7, at 543.
44. Lunsford, supra note 7, at 544.
45. See, e.g., Remarks of Mr. Hofstetter, 59 TRADEMARK REP., supra note 8, at
748-49; 3 R. CALLMAN, supra note 2, at 242-43 & n.86.
46. Other common law torts might be considered as sources of an action by a
trademark holder against a dictionary publisher but for the purposes of this article
only those listed are worthy of treatment. This section deals mostly with intentional
torts as where the dictionary publisher was informed of misuse but took no corrective
action. This would generally be the case since a trademark holder should only resort
to legal action where non-legal remedies, such as objection, have failed.
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1. Defamation
The initial problem for a trademark holder bringing a def-
amation action against a dictionary publisher would be to cat-
egorize the generic dictionary listing as a defamatory commu-
nication.47 A corporation is defamed only if the statement
reflects adversely upon its integrity or "business character. 48
The generic listing of a trademark does not harm the business
reputation of the holding corporation.
A further difficulty facing the trademark owner is
presented by the solid defenses available for the dictionary
publisher who has negligently or intentionally listed a regis-
tered trademark as a generic term. Truth would be the pub-
lisher's primary defense as he would be free to show that the
term was correctly listed as a generic term.4" In addition, the
usual tort defenses of acquiescence, laches and abandonment
would be available to the dictionary publisher.5
The publisher could also assert the constitutional privi-
leges afforded the mass media for false defamatory state-
ments. Since a corporation is not a "public figure," 51 the stan-
dard announced by the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.2 would apply. Thus, the dictionary publisher
would be liable only if he was negligent in listing the mark as
a generic term. However, if a court determined that a trade-
mark owning corporation was a "public figure,"5" then the
stronger constitutional privilege of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan54 could be used by the dictionary publisher. Under
47. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 111 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER], for an excellent discussion of the required elements for a cause of action in
defamation.
48. Id. at 745.
49. See Remarks of Mr. Hofstetter, 59 TRADEMARK REP., supra note 8, at 749.
50. Id.
51. See PROSSER, supra note 47, at 823-24. The courts have thus far limited "pub-
lic figures" to living persons, but corporations are capable of satisfying the "public
figure" tests of going public or seeking publicity and this may influence a future court
to categorize a corporation as a "public figure." Id. See also the Court's discussion of
"public figure" in the companion cases of Associated Press v. Walker and Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
52. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Court held in Gertz that a private person could not
maintain an action for defamation against a mass medium unless that medium was at
least negligent in publishing the defamation.
53. See note 51 supra.
54. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Supreme Court, in the Sullivan case, gave a constitu-
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this privilege, the publisher could not be found liable unless
he acted with knowledge that the generic listing was false or
with reckless disregard for its truth.
A defamation action brought against a dictionary pub-
lisher for listing the plaintiff's trademark as a generic term,
absent extraordinary circumstances, 5 could not succeed. Even
if defamation was broad enough to encompass generic misuse
of trademarks, the unavailability of an injunction renders re-
lief inadequate as damages may not compensate for the ulti-
mate loss of the trademark."
2. Commercial Disparagement5 7
The tort of commercial disparagement provides for an ac-
tion against persons who intend to and do cause pecuniary
loss to a business enterprise by publishing falsehoods which
reflect upon the quality of the business' goods.58 This intent
requirement is the first of several roadblocks lying in the way
of a trademark holder who wishes to use commercial dispar-
agement against a dictionary publisher. The trademark owner
would have to prove an "improper intent ' 5 by the publisher
to cause him financial harm. This would be futile since the
publisher is merely advancing his own legitimate interests.6
tional privilege to news media to publish false defamatory statements about public
persons as long as these were published without "malice," i.e., without knowledge
that the statements were false or made with reckless disregard for the truth. The
privilege granted is conditional in that the publisher will lose it if "malice" is proven.
55. Where the dictionary definition of the trademark expressly defames the integ-
rity or reputation of the holder, there would be a good cause of action in defamation,
assuming that the other elements are satisfied. E.g., Coke [pronunciation], n., Trade-
mark, a dark-colored, carbonated soft drink produced by persons who murder babies
and never pay the bills [short for Coca-Cola, a trademark].
56. See Developments, supra note 35, at 893.
57. This tort action has also been called "injurious falsehood," "trade libel," "dis-
paragement of property," "slander of goods" and "disparagement of quality."
58. See Developments, supra note 35, at 893; PROSSER, supra note 47, at 915-17.
Though similar to defamation, disparagement focuses upon harm to economic re-
lations rather than to reputation alone. PROSSER, supra note 47, at 917.
59. Developments, supra note 35, at 895. Many courts still speak of a "malice"
requirement for disparagement but this is normally satisfied by any sort of bad faith.
Id. Several commentators have argued for the elimination of this intent requirement.
See, e.g., Smith, Disparagement of Property, 13 COLUM. L. REv. 121, 137-39 (1913);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTs §§ 626, 628 (1938). Both would allow the action based on the
reasonable foreseeability of harm alone.
60. Even though disparagement is generally applicable to trademarks, PROSSER,
supra note 47, at 918-19, the tort is rarely applied outside of the context of unfair
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Another obstacle for the trademark holder is characteriz-
ing the generic listing of his trademark as a false criticism of
his product's quality. Even where other products falling
within the generic definition are inferior to the trademark
owner's own, the dictionary publisher has made no false state-
ment reflecting upon the quality of the trademark owner's
product.6'
As disparagement, like defamation, is not a ground for in-
junctive relief, the only remedy is in damages.6 2 But unlike
defamation, disparagement limits recovery to special damages
which must be pleaded and proved. This requirement in-
volves proof of causation 4 which could easily thwart the
trademark holder's action considering the use made of dic-
tionary listings in trademark litigation. 5
Furthermore, all of the common law defenses and constitu-
tional privileges in defamation cases would be open to the dic-
tionary publisher in a disparagement suit. 6 In view of these
available defenses and the problems of satisfying the prima
facie elements of the action, commercial disparagement is at
best a doubtful source of legal action by a trademark owner
against generic use of his mark by a dictionary publisher.
competition. Id. at 917. As the dictionary publisher is not in competition with the
trademark holder, it is not likely that he will be in bad faith. "Such a motive [im-
proper intent] will almost always be present in cases involving competitors, but ap-
plication of the test to noncompetitors is more troublesome." Developments, supra
note 35, at 895 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
61. The decision to list the trademark as a generic term may be treated as a state-
ment of opinion such that the only question becomes whether the dictionary pub-
lisher believed that the entry was correct. See Developments, supra note 35, at 898-
99. Prosser states that "[T]he better view, which is now more generally accepted, is
that a genuine belief in [the statement's] truth is sufficient, however unfounded or
unreasonable it may be." PROSSER, supra note 47, at 925.
In addition, the trademark owner in a disparagement action would have the proce-
dural burden of proving the listing false whereas in defamation the publisher would
have the burden of proving the correctness of the generic definition. See Develop-
ments, supra note 35, at 898-99.
62. See Developments, supra note 35, at 902-05.
63. Id. at 899-900.
64. Id. at 901. If the plaintiff in disparagement can show an indirect loss by a
drop in sales, most courts will allow recovery if "the causal relationship with the de-
fendant's statement can adequately be shown." Id.
65. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
66. PROSSER, supra note 47, at 924. See notes 51-54 supra.
[Vol. 65:179
TRADEMARK MISUSE
3. Interference with Contractual Relations
Liability for interference with contractual relations re-
quires an intentional interference with an existing contract 67
and this intent requirement poses the greatest problem for a
trademark holder who would use this action against a diction-
ary publisher for the improper generic listing of his trade-
mark. Though a few commentators have argued that negli-
gence should be enough,"8 almost all courts require that the
interference be intentional.6 9 Since a dictionary publisher nor-
mally does not know of any contractual relations entered into
by the trademark owner with which his generic listing would
interfere, he cannot have intended any interference. Even if
the publisher were aware of contracts entered into by the
trademark owning corporation his actions would be privileged
because his primary purpose is to seek his own unrelated
advantage. 0
In addition, the usual tort element of causation immensely
narrows the cause of action. It is difficult to imagine situations
where an improper generic dictionary listing would be "a sub-
stantial factor in the failure of one of the parties to perform
his obligations under the contract. 7 1 Consequently, the action
67. See generally PROSSER, supra note 47, at 927-49; Developments, supra note
35, at 959-69; Harper, Interference with Contractual Relations, 47 Nw. U. L. REv.
873 (1953).
68. See, e.g., Harper, supra note 67, at 884-93. ("It should be enough to establish
a prima facie case if the defendant, as a reasonable man, should have known of the
likelihood of the existence of the contract and thereafter created an unreasonable risk
of interfering with it.") Id. at 886.
69. See PROSSER, supra note 47, at 938 & 941; Developments, supra note 35, at
960-61. Even Harper agrees: "[A]s a general rule, negligent interference with contrac-
tual relations does not exist." Harper, supra note 67, at 892.
But for the privilege and causation factors, see notes 70 & 71 and accompanying
text infra, the trademark holder would probably have grounds for an action in inter-
ference with contractual relations if negligence alone were enough.
70. See PROSSER, supra note 47, at 942-46 for a discussion of privilege as a defense
to liability against interference with contractual relations.
71. Harper, supra note 67, at 882.
There are two ways a defendant may cause an interference with another's con-
tract: (1) He may physically or by some other tortious means prevent performance by
a willing promisor or (2) induce one of the parties to enter into an inconsistent obliga-
tion or break the contract altogether. See Developments, supra note 35, at 960; PRos-
SER, supra note 47, at 934-38. Situations are at least imaginable which would place
the dictionary publisher who incorrectly lists a trademark as a generic term in the
second category of interference. For example, even though the bulk of consumer
transactions consist of executed contracts a purchaser in an executory contract might
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fails to provide an aggrieved trademark holder with an ade-
quate remedy.
4. Interference with Prospective Advantage
The similarity of interference with prospective advantage
to interference with contractual relations renders the obstacle
of intent 2 fully applicable where the trademark holder would
base his action against the dictionary publisher on interfer-
ence with prospective advantage.7 3 The tort extends the liabil-
ity of interference with contractual relations to situations
where there is no existing contract but only the potential for
economic gain.7 4 Thus, causation would be less difficult but
the trademark holder would still have to show that the generic
listing caused future purchasers of his product to opt for other
brands thus depriving him of the opportunity of doing busi-
ness. 7 5 Mitigating this broader applicability is the more exten-
sive privilege afforded defendants in interference with pro-
spective advantage suits.7 6 A dictionary publisher need only
assert his privilege to fully compete in the marketplace to de-
feat a trademark holder's action under this theory.77
5. Interference with Property
The courts are not resolved as to whether a trademark
should be classified as a form of property and those which do
recognize it as such differ widely as to the amount of protec-
tion granted.78 Nevertheless, the courts are agreed that a reg-
istered trademark is not property subject to an action for con-
see the dictionary listing and break the contract under the belief that the producer is
not the owner of an exclusive product or that other producers of the generic good will
be less expensive.
72. See notes 67-69 supra and accompanying text.
73. See PROSSER, supra note 47, at 949-59 & n.52. "The cause of action [interfer-
ence with prospective advantage] has run parallel to that for interference with ex-
isting contracts." Id. at 952.
74. For a general discussion of interference with prospective advantage, see PRos-
SER, supra note 47, at 949-69.
75. See id. at 949-51.
76. Id. at 754.
77. The privilege of competition is given special recognition by the courts. Id. at
954-62.
78. See generally 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 2:6, at 54-57; 3 R. CALLMA,
supra note 2, at 28-47.
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version.7' Accordingly, a trademark owner cannot base an
action on the common law tort of interference with property.
III. SUGGESTED LEGISLATION FOR PROTECTION OF TRADEMARK
OWNERS AGAINST GENERIC DICTIONARY LISTINGS
The need for effective legal action against the generic mis-
use of one's trademark by a dictionary publisher8" and the in-
adequacy of existing causes of action8 ' point to a deficiency in
the source of trademark protection: the federal Lanham Act.
To rectify this protective gap, the Lanham Act should be
amended to include a provision providing for a cause of action
for trademark infringement against anyone that repeatedly
uses a registered trademark in a manner which causes it to
lose its significance as an indication of origin.2
The nonspecification of a remedy would allow the courts to
determine the fairest and most appropriate remedy in each
instance. Freedom of speech objections made by critics of sim-
ilar Lanham Act provisions s are answered by the action's lim-
itation to mass media, the requirement that the generic use be
repeated and the rigorous causation requirement. Such an
amendment would give the trademark holder a way to prevent
the transformation of his mark into a generic term which nor-
mally results from its inclusion in a dictionary as a descriptive
word.8"
79. Only those intangible rights which can be represented by a document are sub-
ject to an action for conversion. See PROSSER, supra note 47, at 81-83.
80. See Part I supra.
81. See Part II supra.
82. Similar provisions have been included in bills to amend the Lanham Act. See
the Hawkes Bill, S. 1919, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); the Wiley Bill, S. 2540, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1953).
Other commentators have called for legislation providing a remedy for a trade-
mark holder against a generic misuser of his mark. See, e.g., Lunsford, supra note 7,
at 545 & 547.
For comparative approaches in other countries, see Misuse of Trademarks in Dic-
tionaries, The Remedy in Denmark, 61 TRADEMARK REP. 468 (1971); Holmquist,
Trademarks in Dictionaries, Under Scandinavian Law, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 754
(1969).
83. See, e.g., Remarks of Sen. Wiley, Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1954).
84. See notes 8-11 supra and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The law offers no legal remedies to the hapless trademark
owning victim of generic misuse. Where a dictionary publisher
refuses to list a trademark as a registered mark or even to
indicate its registered status, the trademark holder can do lit-
tle to prevent his mark from becoming a "common descriptive
name" 85 subject to cancellation under the Lanham Act. This
article suggests a curative amendment to the Lanham Act
providing for a remedy against generic misusers of a trade-
mark under narrow circumstances. Such legislation would en-
able a trademark owner to proceed against a dictionary pub-
lisher who lists his valuable mark as a generic term and
thereby preserve the mark's distinctiveness as an indication of
origin of his, and only his, product.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1946) (as amended).
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